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Abstract
The idea of Balinese culture as a unique, largely timeless, 
harmonious synthesis of religion, custom and art is 
remarkably resistant to historical and contemporary 
evidence to the contrary. Such a hegemonic vision, however 
imaginary, conveniently underwrites both local politics 
and tourism, and so national and global capitalism. Against 
this ideal of Bali-as-Paradise, a critical analysis suggests a 
quite different metaphor—Bali-as-a-battlefield—in many 
instances to be more appropriate and accurate. To understand 
why the Arcadian myth has proven so attractive to both 
Balinese and foreigners, we need to examine the work done 
by social imaginaries. Hypostatizing, essentializing, then 
mythologizing, a largely imaginary monolithic ‘Balinese 
culture’ delivers a docile population which not only accepts, 
but enthusiastically embraces, their increasing alienation 
and their subjection to the political and economic forces of 
capitalism.
Key words: Balinese culture, social imaginaries, critical 
analysis, Bali as abattlefield
Abstrak
Ide budaya Bali sebagai sesuatu yang unik, sebagai sesuatu 
yang abadi, sebagai sintesis harmonis dari agama, adat dan 
seni ternyata sangat tahan terhadap bukti-bukti sejarah 
dan kontemporer untuk mengatakan kebalikannya. Visi 
hegemonik namun imajiner itu terletak baik pada politik 
lokal maupun pariwisata, serta juga pada kapitalisme 
nasional dan global. Berlawanan dari gagasan ideal ini, dari 
“Bali-sebagai-Paradise”, sebuah analisis kritis menunjukkan 
metafora “Bali-sebagai-medan-perang”, dalam banyak hal, 
menjadi lebih tepat dan akurat. Untuk memahami mengapa 
mitos Arcadian ini terbukti begitu menarik untuk Bali dan 
orang asing, kita perlu memeriksa pekerjaan yang dilakukan 
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oleh imaginaries sosial. Hipostatisasi, esensialisasi, dan 
kemudian mitologisasi,  sebuah imajinasi monolitik ‘budaya 
Bali’ memberikan populasi jinak yang tidak hanya menerima, 
tapi antusias merangkul, meningkatkan keterasingan 
mereka dan tunduk kepada kekuatan politik dan ekonomi 
kapitalisme.
Kata Kunci: Budaya Bali, imaginari sosial, analsis kritis, Bali 
sebagai medan perang
Bali dikenal luas karena keunikan budayanya, kekhasan yang tumbuh 
dari jiwa agama hindu yang tidak dapat terlepaskan dari adat, tradisi, 
dan keseniannya dalam masyarakat yang bercirikan sosial religius… 
Sejalan dengan bergulirnya sang kala, budaya Bali tidak menolak 
kemajuan teknologi sepanjang teknologi tersebut menguatkan budaya 
bali. Oleh karena visi Dinas Kebudayaan Provinsi Bali adalah Pelestarian, 
Pengembangan, dan Pemberdayaan Kebudayaan Bali, menuju Bali yang 
maju, aman, damai, dan sejahtera (Opening statement on the Dinas 
Kebudayaan Provinsi Bali website by its head, I Ketut Suastika SH.).1
Culture…has always been an idea post factum, a notion oriented 
towards the past (to ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’), descriptive of a state of 
affairs (and often of a status quo), a nostalgic idea at best (when it mixed 
the study of exotic societies with regret) and a reactionary ideologeme at 
worst (Fabian 1991: 192).
Somewhere Covarrubias tells a Just So story about Bali. After the Gods had relinquished the island to humans, belatedly they 
realized that it was perfect. To prevent Balinese enjoying flawless 
paradise, they sent them dogs. Not to be outdone, Westerners 
subsequently inflicted far more devastating damage by bequeathing 
Culture to Bali. When politicians, government agencies, the tourist 
industry and the local and international arts’ crowds vie to outdo 
one another in trumpeting Bali’s unique culture,2 you know that 
1 Bali is widely known because of the uniqueness of its culture, its special 
characteristics which grow out of its Hindu religious spirit which cannot be 
separated from custom, tradition, and its art in a society which is character-
ized as social-religious… In accordance with the evolving times, Balinese 
culture does not reject technological progress provided that the technology 
mentioned strengthens Balinese culture. So the vision of the Balinese Pro-
vincial Culture Service is the Conservation, Development and Empower-
ment of Balinese Culture heading to a Bali which is progressive, safe, peace-
ful and prosperous.
2 As the opening quotation shows, so doing confers on culture at once the 
properties of an abstract noun, an organism, a transcendental agent and a 
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something has gone badly wrong. As a gift, Culture, together with 
an array of linked concepts, is a poisoned chalice. Pointing out 
that, predicated of Bali, culture is an empty signifier is unlikely to 
change much, because deeply entrenched interests are invested in 
fostering, preserving and defending the fantasy.
This obsession with culture is inextricable from the state of 
scholarship on Bali. For so small a place, it is disproportionately 
awash with professed experts and students. How is this possible 
given the voluminous literature in Dutch and the difficulties of the 
different levels of Balinese language, quite apart from kawi and, 
obviously, Indonesian? While a limited knowledge of Balinese 
might be acceptable for researchers on the government sector 
where Indonesian is the working language, for the study of daily 
life and custom, let alone religion and theatre where people are 
commenting to themselves on their own lives, command of Balinese 
would seem a sine qua non. Yet such expertise is the exception rather 
than the rule, presumably because mastering Balinese language and 
literature takes years, indeed decades. Faced with these demands, 
despite the deep deficiencies, many scholars seem happily to 
conclude that Indonesian—or sometimes even English—is a quite 
adequate medium of inquiry. How charmingly neo-colonial that 
Balinese should have to explain and interpret their own practices 
to foreigners not only in foreign registers but using alien concepts 
such as culture, art and meaning.3 As James Clifford noted, to 
collective subject, while simultaneously hypostatizing and reifying it. 
 This article was originally presented as a paper at a panel on Bali: repre-
sentations of culture at the International Bali Studies Conference on Bali in 
global Asia: between modernization and heritage formation, July 2012. The aim 
was to problematize both culture and its representation, as well as to avoid 
the simplistic, but to some strangely satisfying, phrase ‘Balinese culture’, 
which by being made a grammatical subject, like the expression ‘the Bali-
nese’, makes it also the subject of articulation. Once you reify and essential-
ize Balinese culture, or even just ‘Bali’, it becomes perilously facile to sum 
up the resulting gallimaufry as paradise or whatever.
3 Although Vickers pointed out nearly twenty years ago (1989) that Bali was 
a nice example of the invention of tradition, the cultural paradise jugger-
naut rattles merrily on. As it happens, the term culture in Indonesian, ke-
budayaan, is a postcolonial neologism and its usage deeply entwined with 
power/knowledge (Hobart 2000). In talk of art and theatre, anachronism 
rules. One of the key figures in branding Bali (notably Ubud) as artistic, the 
late Cokorda Gedé Agung Sukawati once explained to me that he and other 
Balinese had no idea what the early tourists were talking about when they 
demanded art, seni. To fill this vacuum, they had to persuade Walter Spies 
190 JURNAL KAJIAN BALI Volume 07, Nomor 01, April 2017
Mark Hobart Hlm. 187–212
back their hegemonic claim to expertise, anthropologists had 
radically to simplify the complexity and diversity of people’s social 
and linguistic practices (1988: 30-31). They did so by creating an 
imaginary, holistic, totalizable object, ‘culture’ which, conveniently, 
was unproblematically encompassable by the trained Western 
mind but not to ‘the native informant’.4 This latter then veers 
between an object to be mined and an authority on particularities 
to be venerated. For Bali, most talk of culture is simply a reductio 
ad absurdum. Especially for theatre and the arts, such invocation 
of culture is often depressingly uncritical. So, in the name of 
respecting, celebrating or promoting Balinese culture, scholars who 
do so unwittingly or otherwise become deeply complicit in, if not 
public relations’ advocates for, complex political, economic and 
personal agendas. Reflecting on Bali’s popularity as an intellectual 
playground, it is hard to avoid concluding that a significant factor 
is that the entry standards are so low. 
What, though, is so wrong with culture? After all, 
commonsensically it underpins a multi-billion dollar industry, 
which keeps Balinese and many others busy making money from 
tourists, quite apart from fueling the visual and performing arts’ 
to leave Yogyakarta for Bali. Raffles far earlier had remarked on this lack.
 The arts are little practised…, the natives have not generally learned the art of 
painting or printing… Their principal manufacture is in krises and warlike instru-
ments; they make fire-arms, and ornament the barrels, but purchase European 
locks (1817: 234).
 Interestingly, while seni is glossed in Indonesian as ‘art’, the term is not 
kawi, nor in Malay where it was ‘fine, thin, clear… graceful or lightly built’ 
(Wilkinson 1959: 1072) from which the step to art-as-what-is-refined seems 
plausible. Likewise, the Indonesian for theatre, téater, is Dutch; sandiwara is 
also a neologism; and pertunjukan as a show or performance derives from 
tunjuk, index finger, to show or point. As Theodoridou argued, it is not self-
evident in what sense Balinese engaged in something they are so often iden-
tified with, namely theatre (2012). And, while so many soi-disant experts 
are profitably engaged in the business of interpreting Balinese culture, the 
indiscriminate use of meaning results in the term being largely vacuous 
(Hobart 1983). Few outsiders seem to realize that Balinese deploy a sophis-
ticated set of criteria for evaluating statements and actions, which are quite 
distinct from and incommensurate with European usage (e.g. Hobart 1999: 
126-31).
4 It is not coincidence that Margaret Mead was a leading proponent of this 
simplistic concept of culture, which she helped to impose on Balinese. Con-
temporary researchers are, of course, following in illustrious footsteps. Clif-
ford Geertz, the father of interpretive anthropology, belatedly admitted that 
he did not speak Balinese. 
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industries. As a long-term strategy however, as Time Magazine’s 
Holidays in Hell5 noted, it risks killing the goose that lays the golden 
eggs. But does it really matter whether we call what is supposedly 
distinctive about Bali ‘culture’ or not? Much depends on what 
knowledge is for. If you are a politician, businessman or pseudo-
scholar on the make, then invoking culture, no matter how vapidly, 
is a free asset that you can milk so long as it makes you money 
and you ignore the long-term consequences. For those of more 
reflexive inclination, understanding how Bali has been imagined, 
what drives the rapid change and how seemingly innocent ideas 
are implicated becomes of immediate interest.
At issue here is the difference between common sense and 
a critical sense of culture. When Raymond Williams famously 
remarked that ‘culture is one of the two or three most complicated 
words in the English language’ (1983: 87), his point was that, in 
Gramsci’s terms, such common sense usage is ideological (1971: 
625). So, casual use of such terms is far from innocent: rather 
they reinforce a particular political-economic order. The outcome 
of talking uncritically about culture and cognate terms such as 
tradition, religion, community, indeed Bali, is that Balinese and 
foreign commentators are unwittingly engaging in reiterating a 
singular hegemony. My purpose here is to examine this hegemony 
and its implications.
The opening quotation from the Dinas Kebudayaan treats 
culture as the central figure of a set which includes custom, 
tradition, art, religion, spirit, which singly and together are 
uniquely identifiable with and predicated of twin subjects: ‘Bali’ 
and ‘the Balinese’. The terms are mutually defined, and so circular 
and tautological. Each term and the relationships between them, as 
generally used, are distinctive in connoting structure, coherence, 
integration, encompassment, non-contradiction and freedom from 
conflict. 
Most Western writers assume that the Balinese view of the cosmos is 
firmly ordered and harmonious, and that human beings must attempt 
to imitate and therefore bring about that order again in this world. For 
these writers, the main aim of temple ritual and much else in Balinese 
culture is to prevent a sinking chaos, which is the absence of order 
(Hildred Geertz 1994: 95).
5  Time World, 9th. April 2011.
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In short we are offered a vision of an ideal, exquisite harmony of 
perfectly synchronized interlocking parts. Difference, incoherence, 
misunderstanding, contradiction, antagonism, conflict and violence 
stem from alien forces; or else are external circumstances to be 
overcome—chaos to be worked upon. This worldview is articulated 
by the conventional translation of the phrase from the Sutasoma, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, as ‘Unity in Diversity’.
What relationship though does this model have to what is 
going on in contemporary Balinese society, inextricably involved 
as it is in the nation state of Indonesia and global capitalism? Put 
another way: whose account is it? And what kind of interests does 
it serve? As Tom Hunter noted of the period when the Sutasoma 
was written, kakawin literature ‘represents the interests of royal and 
priestly actors with a large stake in maintaining a fixed symbolic 
order’ (2007: 27). If enunciations in Java historically served the 
élite’s interests, why should they not in contemporary Bali? 
Rather than accept the current account of culture as self-evident, 
incontrovertible fact, perhaps we should ask a few questions. Who 
has articulated this harmonious vision of Balinese culture? What 
relationship does it bear to other characterizations? Under what 
conditions were such accounts produced? And what is at issue 
in such representations of so complicated an actuality as Bali as 
variously appreciated by different participants?6 
Pythagoras in place
Richard Fox has linked the provenance of the Pythagorean vision 
of Bali to the New Order’s State Ideology, Pancasila, and argues 
how this came to be implemented locally through the Balinese 
Hindu Dharma Council, Parisada Hindu Dharma (2011: 55-58). 
While depicting Bali as an unspoiled harmonious paradise fits 
longstanding European fantasies about remote places (Ardener 
6 A more intriguing question is what are the circumstances under which the 
different kinds of representations of Java and Bali came about that occur in 
the pre-colonial literature? Regrettably I am not qualified to answer this.
 Because Bali geographically is an island, it would be simplistic to assume 
that Bali refers exclusively and exhaustively to a definite place and all, or 
most, of its inhabitants. As Jim Boon noted (1977), Bali played an important 
role in European imagination before anyone knew anything about it—and 
has continued to do so.
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1987, Vickers 2012) and predates the New Order’s use of culture 
to depoliticize Indonesians,7 another aspect of Fox’s argument 
deserves attention. It is the crucial role of the mass media in 
articulating meticulously engineered portrayals of Bali, which, like 
all such representations, are more significant for what they omit 
and disarticulate than for the necessarily reductive figures that they 
foreground. The use of synecdoche enables Bali to be conveniently 
summed up as ‘culture’. What is quite remarkable is that both 
Balinese and foreign intellectuals mostly continue to pretend that it 
is adequate to talk about Bali as if the mass media were irrelevant 
or dismissible as simply one consideration among many. To do so 
overlooks the extent to which, since the 1980s, Balinese (and others) 
have been bombarded with tightly crafted depictions of themselves 
and their society, and have learned to recognize themselves in these 
accounts.
The massive simplification that broadcast media enable—and 
indeed require in order to work—is a necessary condition for 
representations of Bali as some divinely ordained fit between a 
geographical place and a homogeneous culture, art and religion.8 
7 Doubtless there is more to be said on the dissemination of ideas of bal-
ance and harmony, but this would involve not only a reading of Indonesian 
and European sources but, perhaps more important, an analysis of Balinese 
theatre performances. As recordings of this last are relatively recent, we 
have little idea how such notions were disseminated, if at all, in pre-colonial 
times.
 The extent to which religion in Bali relies on mass mediation should be obvi-
ous from the programming of Bali TV. More broadly, a study of some 8,000 
recordings in the Balinese Television Project archives made between 2000-
2007 of programmes about the arts, society and religion on TVRI Denpasar 
and national television, shows an interesting distribution of synonyms for 
harmony. The Javanese term rukun was used in 13 broadcasts: significantly 
all were religious. The term occurred nowhere else. Harmoni(s) occurred 
in 22 broadcasts, again overwhelmingly religious. Most widely found was 
seimbang (in 38 programmes), mostly again in religious programmes, but 
also those about government development. Aficionados of Bali as a har-
monious culture will be cheered to learn that their vision was espoused by 
the former Governor, Ida Bagus Oka, who managed to get both harmony 
and balance into his opening address to the 1991 Arts Festival. Broadcasting 
performing arts is, of course, a crucial means of disseminating official, but 
increasingly hegemonic, representations of culture. 
8 My mentor in the study of Bali, Christiaan Hooykaas, used to protest 
against the provincial government’s tidying and sanitizing religion by ar-
guing instead that, in terms of texts and practice, it should be designated 
Agama Tirtha, the religion of holy water (e.g. 1964). Failing that, it could 
best be labelled as Hindu-Buddhist. At every turn fluidity and contextually 
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As Adrian Vickers found it necessary to remind readers: ‘The 
physical boundaries of “Bali” have always been problematic’ (2012: 
301). From their slave raids of the eastern islands to their impact on 
the language of Batawi, Balinese have long been a presence across 
Indonesia, as in turn have been other societies in Bali.9 So Balinese 
attempts to airbrush Javanese out of, say, their political history 
or the performing arts require selective amnesia.10 Just as Bali is 
not a neatly circumscribed place, nor are Balinese a natural entity 
or species. To the extent that they and their commentators have 
come to think of themselves as such involves what Althusser called 
interpellation: they have been assiduously addressed and trained to 
recognize themselves and respond accordingly, especially recently 
through radio, television and social media. As a corrective, it may 
be helpful to think of Bali not as a place or a culture, but as a brand 
with the unique selling point of a peculiarly harmonious synthesis 
of culture, art and religion (Hobart 2011).
Bali as a battlefield
It requires hard work to ignore the blindingly obvious. What we 
know of Balinese history suggests that it has been distinguished 
by widespread oppression, strife, war and violence, when ordinary 
people were the victims of corruption, gangsterism, greed and 
savagery with little redress whether in pre-colonial (e.g. Hanna 
2004; Worsley 1972; Vickers 2005), colonial or post-colonial periods 
(Robinson 1995; Schulte-Nordholt, 2007).11 The received history of 
diverging practices are dressed up as the unfolding of an authentic, unadul-
terated, unchanging essence.
9 They have also had a global presence as an imaginary since Hollywood 
film. Both The Big Sleep and Some Like It Hot include gratuitous references to 
Balinese dancers.
10 Amusingly, such widely acknowledged exemplars of Balinese cultural 
creativity as the late I Wayan Beratha were disarmingly honest about the 
sources of their inspiration. He explained that, when he or his friends 
ran out of ideas, they simply went over to Java, took what they liked and 
adapted it (personal communication).
11 Nor was the colonial period the idyll it is often made out to be (e.g. Covarru-
bias 1937). Consider just one of Vickers’s summations of the lot of non-élite 
Balinese.
 In 1917 there was a massive earthquake, which flattened whole villages, 
destroyed some of Bali’s foremost temples, and damaged some of the most 
beautiful palaces; in all 1350 lives were lost. After that came mouse plagues 
and other forms of devastation of rice-crops, closely followed by a world-
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Bali is arguably a history of silences, evasions and counter-factual 
colouration. For example, consider the striking contrast between 
the widespread brutality and violence of pre-colonial Bali and its 
rose-tinted representations in contemporary dance and theatre. It 
seems historically that the more social life became anarchic and 
anomic, the more literary accounts stressed visions of a wondrous, 
luminous, stable world order (Hobart 2007: 122-24). It is not hard 
to work out in whose interests such representations were—and 
are. More generally, to avoid seeing the scale of institutionalized 
conflict and violence in Bali over the last seventy years requires the 
dedicated myopia of a single-minded ostrich.12
So, the kindest reading of the Pythagorean vision of historical 
or present day Bali is reminiscent of Samuel Johnson’s dictum 
about second marriages: ‘The triumph of hope over experience’. 
The conventional translation of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika needs to be set 
against other kakawin. For instance, writing about the background 
to the Śiwarātrikalpa, the authors note that
another compulsory feature of almost all kakawin (poems) is the elaborate, 
and to our taste exaggerated, descriptions of wars and battles between 
armies of heroes and demons... The fantastic weapons and gruesome 
methods of warfare which the poet’s imagination conjures up are almost 
equal to what our modern society has actually achieved’ (Teeuw et al. 
1969: 31-32). 
Studies of the kidung literature (e.g. Vickers 2005) or Balinese 
babad (Worsley 1972) show the pervasiveness of discord, disruption, 
wide epidemic of Spanish influenza, which claimed tens of thousands of 
lives.
 
Soon after came the Depression, which hit Bali’s exports. By 1934 pigs 
and copra, the two major exports, had fallen to a quarter of their former 
price, and Balinese coins, képéng, had been virtually halved in value. Hard 
on the heels of this came further mouse plagues and devastation of rice-
crops. Many at that time lost their land holdings and were on the verge of 
starvation.
 
The charmed circle of expatriates, however, were oblivious to all 
of this. 
 The Dutch colonial ideal of law and order meant control and an appearance of peace 
for the Dutch and suffering for the Balinese. Balinese at the time saw this as an age of 
wage labor, when lower-ranking aristocrats appointed to official posts could terror-
ize and control the population through spies and violence, and could serve their own 
interests through corruption and sexual claims over pretty local women, but who 
nevertheless could not control the gangs of thieves and bandits created by the social 
dislocation (2012: 148-9). 
12  That Indonesians have kept quiet about the Orde Baru government’s neat 
airbrushing out of the execution of some 100,000 Balinese in 1965-66 is perhaps 
understandable. That foreigners have found it convenient to collude is less so.
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fighting and the virtual omnipresence, even celebration, of murder, 
mutilation and mayhem.13 Analyses of painting (e.g. Geertz 1994) 
and theatre (e.g. Fox 2011: 218-300) reveal similar preoccupations. 
What is notably absent from such representations is the response to 
such threats and dangers, namely fear, which loomed large in older 
villagers’ memories of their lives under the rajas and later. 
By many accounts Bali often resembled less a paradise than 
a battlefield. And, if you look past the glitz and glamour of the 
façade at the competition for the rich spoils of tourism and the 
endless political infighting, to conflicts in banjar and the activities 
of préman, a rather different Bali carries on seemingly unabated. 
However, my aim is not to replace one hegemonic articulation with 
another. It is to draw attention to how entrenched these Arcadian 
fantasies of Balinese culture are and what they are doing. There are 
several reasons for invoking the image of Bali as a battlefield. First, 
introducing an alternative image or paradigm to the dominant one 
calls into question the self-evident verisimilitude of the dominant 
image, a ploy Foucault used to effect with his deliberately jarring 
use of metaphor. Second, it raises questions about who is doing 
the enunciating and the circumstances under which they do so. 
Third, it draws attention to the differing registers that Balinese and 
commentators use to describe, interpret or explain what is going 
on. Fourth, it sets historical and contemporary accounts by different 
groups of Balinese against the dominant government, corporate and 
mass media representations.14 Finally it opens the way to inquiry 
into the conflicts and antagonisms that are suppressed, ignored or 
denied in most approaches to culture. 
The discipline that most suggestively explores culture not as 
13 Cycles such as Malat are at least as much Javanese as Balinese. We should 
not however fall into the trap of hypostatizing social practices into 
essentially different substances, aka cultures. For symmetry, it would be fun 
to complete Johnson’s quotation by stating that such a literary account, like 
first marriage ‘is the triumph of imagination over intelligence’. However 
presumably intelligence would have advised Javanese and Balinese 
authors to err on the side of caution if they wished to continue writing or 
even living.
14 That is not to suggest that these élite accounts are univocal or that many 
Balinese do not reiterate or even enthusiastically embrace—or appear 
to—such public representations on many occasions. That, after all, is what 
hegemony is about. However what people say tends to depend on whom 
they are speaking to and in what context.
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the creation of unity out of diversity, but as a site of—or, as I would 
prefer, moments of—struggle is Cultural Studies.15 Cultural Studies 
brings to the discussion recognition of the multiple antagonisms 
that permeate Balinese society, but which are hidden or finessed by 
the Pythagorean vision. That, of course, is one of the latter’s main 
functions. What is less obvious is how great mass spectacles such as 
the Bali International Arts Festival on the one hand and the modern 
mass media on the other underpin a manufactured semblance of 
integration and harmony. The point about spectacles is that, like 
most representations which prioritize the visual, they minimize the 
role of dialogue, discussion and argument by presenting tableaux 
vivants, which are then articulated by members of the élite through 
speeches, television commentary or, for Sendratari, by a single 
dalang.16 The importance of dance as the brand image of Bali is 
not accidental. Here dialogue and the possibility of articulating 
anything untoward have been nicely excised. Television famously 
positions viewers in tightly controlled viewing positions, 
having surrendered much agency to privileged enunciators and 
commentators.17 Even the Cultural Studies’ formulation of culture 
15 The phrase culture as a ‘site of struggle’ is widely attributed to Stuart Hall 
(e.g. Grossberg 1996: 158). What Hall actually wrote was: ‘Popular culture is 
one of the sites where this struggle for and against a culture of the powerful 
is engaged’ (1994: 466). Note how this echoes Vološinov: ‘Class does not 
coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community which is the 
totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication. 
Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a 
result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign 
becomes an arena of the class struggle’ (1973: 23). Class difference and 
concomitant inequalities are, of course, antagonisms neatly sutured by an 
imagined culture-for-all.
16 Conflict is necessary to theatre plots but, in Barthes’s terms, it is neatly 
inoculated either by being projected onto the distant past and safe mythical 
figures like the Pandawa and Korawa or resolved narratively (1973: 150). 
If the point about the visual tending to minimize argument is unclear, 
consider coverage of such wonderful misnomers as ‘the Arab Spring’. 
Television footage of Egypt’s Tahrir Square showed a multitude of people 
subject to the voiceover of a single commentator who provides a unified 
summation of the presumed thoughts of tens of thousands of people. Were 
you to have attached a microphone to each person, the resulting diversity 
would probably be inexpressible and incomprehensible. It is therefore to 
be avoided.
17 An example is the authority vested in figures like Bali TV’s Ida Pedanda 
Madé Gunung. John Ellis made the point.
 The whole domestic arrangement of broadcast TV and the aesthetic forms 
it has evolved to come to terms with this domestic arrangement provides 
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as sites of struggle involves spatializing and visualizing actions on 
particular occasions. 
The missing link—mechanical solidarity
A paradox about Bali is that the more its unique culture is celebrated, 
the less there is, whether imagined anthropologically as the variety 
of local customs or as an evolving self-sustaining contribution to 
civilization—unless we reduce that to branded shopping malls or 
Son et Lumière such as Bali Agung complete with elephants. Driven 
by the multiple demands of government, the tourist industry 
and mass media for increasingly standardized, recognizable, 
marketable products, Balinese have eagerly learned the art of 
mechanical reproduction needed to partake in the culture industry 
(Adorno & Horkheimer 1972; Benjamin 1977). Think of the mass 
production lines of woodcarvings or stone statues, or how many 
Barong dances are performed every morning and a stock repertoire 
of kebyar dances every evening to charabancs of tourists.18 Claims 
about the fabled creativity of Balinese mask, with a few notable 
exceptions, mask its increasing absence. Balinese have avidly and 
largely unreflectively McDonaldized themselves.19
Considering its relevance, it is surprising that the sociologist 
Émile Durkheim’s theory of modes of social solidarity has not 
been invoked more often to elucidate striking features of Balinese 
society. Modern societies are distinguished by a complex division 
of labour, in which differentiation of complementary functions is 
highly developed, so that people depend upon one another in what 
broadcast TV with the capability to do this and no more. The citizenship 
that it provides as the position for its viewers is a position of impotence: 
TV viewers are able to see ‘life’s parade at their fingertips’, but at the cost 
of exempting themselves from that parade for the duration of their TV 
viewing (1992: 169-70). 
18 Delightfully, that leading exponent of Balinese culture Margaret Mead, to-
gether with Gregory Bateson, played a role in making such anodyne Bar-
ong dances possible. They wanted to film a Calon Arang, but quite apart 
from the risks of filming an event at night so potentially imbued with sakti, 
technology then did not permit it. Balinese, discovering that a daytime 
performance did not bring the sky down, neatly turned it to commercial 
advantage.
19 The term (from Ritzer 1993) indicates the process by which goods and la-
bour become standardized as commodities under consumer capitalism. 
Deleuze, with Guattari, has given a more thoughtful and philosophically 
nuanced account in Thousand plateaus (1988) and Societies of control (1992), 
to which I refer below.
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Durkheim called organic solidarity. The opposite is mechanical 
solidarity. Here groups (in Bali banjar, désa, subak, sekaha etc.) are 
central to social life and organize much of their members’ activities, 
often backed by formidable sanctions. Social integration emerges 
through emphasis on similarity and conformity to shared values, 
reinforced through religion and the arts. Balinese society instantiates 
mechanical solidarity to a remarkable degree. The result is its 
famous social cohesion and organization, but at the price of treating 
originality or deviation from the norm as potential threats. Instead 
creativity is confined to endlessly elaborating existing ways of 
doing things rather than exploring new ones. Goldenweiser called 
this ‘involution’ (1936; cf. Clifford Geertz’s extension to agriculture, 
1968). Simulated novelty disguises the absence of change in any 
serious sense. Think of the endlessly similar tari kebyar at successive 
Arts Festivals. Bali’s real motto is: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même 
chose.20 That is not enough. To prevent the palpable limitations of 
mechanical solidarity becoming evident also requires a model of 
representation that fits and confirms this world narrative. What is 
it?
After representation
Such a model must treat representation as about using signs, images, 
laws and classifications faithfully to reflect a pre-existing reality 
that adequately encapsulates knowledge, yet remains unaffected 
by the act of representing.
Knowledge can be known, our dominant tradition seems to feel, only 
through re-presentation and re-production, through sign-systems, 
models, law-relations, or at least taxonomies whose common mission is 
to create order... Culture gained its currency as a cover-all concept and 
its historical function as a point de repère…by serving as a short term for 
a theory of knowledge and not...for a theory of conduct (Fabian 1991: 
191)
More important still, the purposes of who does the representing and 
under what circumstances must be expunged by appeal to what is 
being carefully placed beyond question: the authority of the past, 
culture, religion or, failing that, the authority of the speaker.21
20  ‘The more it changes, the more it is the same thing’.
21 Such appeal to authority is an informal logical fallacy: argumentum ad vere-
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By contrast, any approach that recognizes contradictions or 
incompatibilities between divergent accounts has to question and—
what is anathema to authority-lovers—to question unquestionables. 
An interesting way of exploring what is at issue is to reflect on 
the term ‘represent’. It presupposes a prior state of presence to 
which what follows is subordinate. Truth, goodness and what is 
authoritative is what most closely resembles this original state or 
presence and what deviates is inferior, compromised, adulterated. 
To challenge this Platonist vision, we require one that allows for 
multiple, divergent and contrary accounts which turns out to be 
the case everywhere except perhaps North Korea. Put simply: 
representing does something. It is a social practice that intervenes 
in and changes the world it describes. So there can be no single, all-
encompassing, true framework for Bali. Different people or interest 
groups represent Bali as something (paradise, hell, the ideal place 
to make money, get drunk or laid, or whatever) to someone on 
some occasion for some purpose under particular circumstances. 
You cannot represent something as it is in its fullness in all the 
possible contexts as understood by every one of the participants. 
Representing is necessarily rather like a cartoon: it picks out and 
emphasizes certain features and naturalizes them at the expense 
of others. So we learn to see the representation as authentic insofar 
as it reiterates previous representations.22 Representing then, 
by definition, is an elegant but deceptive act of betrayal, which 
transforms what it purports to depict faithfully, then naturalizes it. 
The enunciations of politicians and officeholders, like the twittering 
of Bali’s many commentators, cannot be judged by how accurately 
they reflect some prior reality because in no small part they 
constitute and change it through their practices. Representing is a 
way of acting on the world, not reflecting it, because ‘representation 
is already mediation’ (Deleuze 1994: 8).
cundiam. Notionally this may be restricted to ‘false authority’, which begs 
the question of what authority determines what is true or false? And what 
happens when authorities differ? Claims to authority are just that—claims 
to be interrogated. 
22 Yet again power inserts itself. The etymology of authentic is linked to 
authority. The Greek root αὐθεντικός (authentikos) ‘of first-hand author-
ity, original,’ derives from αὐθεντία (afthentia) ‘original authority,’ and 
αὐθέντης (afthéntis) ‘one who does a thing himself, a principal, a master, 
an autocrat’ (The English Oxford Dictionary).
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Conventional accounts of representation presuppose a static 
world where copies are measured against the authenticity and 
primacy of the original. So doing underplays how far we rework 
things through our practices of talking, depicting and so on.
The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just 
as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which 
refers it back to the concept. In the theatre of repetition, we experience 
pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary 
upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a 
language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop 
before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and 
phantoms before characters—the whole apparatus of repetition as a 
‘terrible power’ (Deleuze 1994: 10).23
Apart from suggesting another way of appreciating that 
proclivity of Balinese, puzzling to foreigners, for watching well 
known stories over and over again, it also enables us to reflect 
on why those in office are so wedded to the impoverishment 
that, conveniently, the mass media enable. There is a ‘necessary 
destruction’ by
the politician, who is above all concerned to deny that which ‘differs’, so 
as to conserve or prolong an established historical order, or to establish 
a historical order which already calls forth in the world the forms of its 
representation (Deleuze 1994: 53).
However innocent they may imagine themselves, proponents of 
Balinese culture as unique are caught up in a field of knowledge 
and power that I doubt they fully understand.
Where to now?
For decades, Bali has been subjected to breakneck social change, 
driven in no small part by corporate capitalism. Unfortunately, how 
Balinese and others discuss what is happening to Balinese culture 
all too often relies on concepts, assumptions and metaphors drawn 
from precisely the model they seek to comment on, so involving 
themselves in a vicious circle.24 They might heed the late Denis 
Healey’s advice: ‘When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging’. 
23 Deleuze managed here neatly to link representation to Artaud’s writing on 
Balinese theatre (1978).
24  For a detailed discussion of the tautologies committed, see Hobart 2000.
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Fortunately there are alternative ways of thinking about Balinese 
society—one of which draws, coincidentally, on Bali’s singular 
contribution to the broader understanding of society and the 
human subject. These include Artaud on the epistemological and 
ontological implications of Balinese theatre, to Bateson’s rethinking 
of society as cybernetic and as patterns of relations not structures. 
By an extraordinary curvature, two key themes originating in the 
study of Bali came together in the work of Deleuze with Guattari: 
Artaud on the Body without Organs and Bateson on plateaus.25 
Deleuze, in particular, proposed different ways of imagining 
representation, society and structure, the human subject and that 
most thorny of concepts: capitalism. Whatever is happening to 
Bali, it is now in some sense ineluctably implicated in national and 
global capitalism. But how are we to understand the changes to 
Bali? And what we mean by capitalism? 
Drawing, perhaps idiosyncratically, upon Deleuze, for present 
purposes might I broadly characterize Balinese society prior to 
colonialism and in gradually decreasing degree afterwards as 
organized around two primary principles—or modes of encoding 
value—which sometimes converged, sometimes diverged: ties 
to land and ties to persons, including notably political patrons?26 
25  As Deleuze and Guattari put it:
Gregory Bateson uses the term plateau for continuous regions of intensity consti-
tuted in such a way that they do not allow themselves to be interrupted by any 
external termination, any more than they allow themselves to build toward a climax; 
examples are certain sexual, or aggressive, processes in Balinese culture. A plateau 
is a piece of immanence. Every BwO [Body without Organs] is made up of plateaus. 
Every BwO is itself a plateau in communication with other plateaus on the plane of 
consistency. The BwO is a component of passage (1988: 158; my parentheses) 
I am still tracing the steps, sometimes intricate, between Artaud’s work on 
Balinese theatre and the Body without Organs and Bateson’s on the Steady 
State and cybernetics. So what follow are my initial thoughts. 
For present purposes, one sense of the Body without Organs is those as-
semblages of practices upon which social organizations depend, but which 
they effectively deny. Whereas structures and organizations are what Lévi-
Strauss designated as en clé de mort (in the [musical] key of death) because 
they tend towards fixity and rigidity, the Body without Organs is en clé de 
vie (in the key of life), because practices are ceaselessly changing. The more 
Balinese are bent on standardizing, institutionalizing, prescribing and fix-
ing—be it religion, music, dance or whatever—the more they move away 
from the Body without Organs towards hypostatized, dead substances, 
which is why the increasingly desperate appeals to art, religion and culture 
are flogging a very dead horse.
26 In a sense the emergence of pecaling and political préman (Schulte Nordholt 
2007) may be considered as new encodings by these two plateaus.
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On Deleuze and Guattari’s various accounts, treating capitalism 
as simply a new mode of political economy is inadequate. What 
makes capitalism different from previous forms of organization 
is that is based on the dissolution of all previously existing 
boundaries, such that in principle anything becomes exchangeable 
with anything else. Its genius lies in decoding what has previously 
been kept separate—whether culture, religion, niṣkala, art, land, 
relationships, meanings—and making them transactable.27 When 
Balinese run money-making courses in spirituality or taksu, tourist 
guides organize tours to see odalan, tooth-filings, cremations or 
trance dances, or the Bali Safari & Marine Park organizes spectacles, 
they are dissolving the differences between—or decoding—what 
was previously kept distinct. Indeed Balinese enthusiasm for 
decoding that which is notionally separate—cash for competitive 
employment or educational opportunities, legal judgements 
or official documents28—suggests that some have embraced 
capitalism with an imaginative vengeance. The consequence of 
such exchangeability is that no belief, meaning, message, code or 
morality can withstand such capitalism because its principle is that 
all codes dissolve into and flow as capital.29
27 The strip development at the side of roads, which destroys subak irrigation 
and the sale of rice land for villas, are two obvious examples of decod-
ing land from its previous reasonably stable plateau. ‘Even art has left the 
spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank’ 
(Deleuze 1992: 6).
28 My favourite is perhaps the wonderful reversal by which instead of local 
television companies paying artists to perform, the artists pay the televi-
sion companies.
29  Colebrook put it clearly:
 Capitalism is also the conclusion of the logic of the signifier. Prior to capitalism we 
can imagine social regimes of interacting and competing codes and flows—flows of 
goods, bodies, women and the codes of life in general. But with the idea of the signi-
fier comes the idea of the subject and capitalism. There is one system—language, 
signification, the signifier—which stands in for and represents an otherwise uni-
form, undifferentiated and meaningless life. The very idea of the signifier is tied to 
decoding; all life can be referred to the system of signification. The signifier creates 
a separation between one regime of signs (language/code) and the world that ex-
ists there to be coded. All other codes—genetics, marked bodies, gestures—can be 
reduced or translated to the system of signification.
 But the despotism of the signifier lies also in its emptiness; it does not represent 
some quantity or quality but is that which allows for the translation and relation of 
all other quantities (2002: 131).
 Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis may help to explain a rather puzzling phe-
nomenon, namely the rise of strikingly dogmatic forms of religion, be they 
labelled Christian, Hindu or Islamic. Are these a refusal to engage in the 
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Without becoming lost in abstruse theory, this account may 
have implications for understanding how capitalism is working in 
Bali. Insofar as Balinese remain determined to turn whatever aspect 
of their society they can manage into capital, there is little point 
in being nostalgic or bemoaning the loss. It follows inexorably 
from the determined decoding that is continuing apace. Appeal to 
religion, tradition and culture is in vain because these are part of a 
representational régime which produces hypostatized entities out of 
living practices. The next step has been to market these. So, however 
noble their intentions, both Balinese and foreigners who participate 
directly or indirectly in this commodification, dissemination and 
transaction of Balinese culture are collusive with a capitalism, the 
effects of which are increasingly obvious. The alternatives would 
take us into the world of the Body without Organs, plateaus and 
other ideas. That discussion is for another occasion.
Afterthoughts
If I may, I shall try to pull some of these threads together. The 
weight of contrary evidence makes it clear that imagining 
Balinese culture as some kind of harmonious Arcadian whole is 
an ideal. Otherwise put: it is ideological. Now Althusser treated 
such totalizing representations as products of what he called 
‘ideological state apparatuses’ (ISAs). Although ISAs are notionally 
partly independent, the state plays a greater or lesser part in 
directing and controlling them. Among the most significant are: 
religious, educational, familial, legal, political (including political 
parties), media and cultural institutions (1984: 151-2). A moment’s 
consideration shows the prima facie pertinence to Bali, where the 
determined attempts to fuse religion, adat and family into a single 
cultural whole are underwritten by education and politics, and 
celebrated endlessly in media from theatre to television.
What, on this account, does ideology do? It provides a 
coherent, inherently convincing and total, if imaginary, world 
view to members of a society, but one that appears to outsiders 
not as truth, but as myth does to ethnographers. Such myths, 
however, ‘do make allusion to reality, and that they need only 
be “interpreted” to discover the reality of the world behind their 
limitless decoding permitted, or encouraged, by contemporary capitalism?
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imaginary representation of that world (ideology = illusion/allusion)’ 
(Althusser 1984: 154). Given that actuality differs significantly from 
the ideal as variously portrayed in Balinese culture, quite how are 
we to understand such social imaginaries? As something that is by 
definition imagined rather than tangible, its status varies according 
to its allotted function in different models of society.30 Broadly though 
it connotes a conscious, more or less institutionalized, framework 
which enables people to make sense of their world and social life as 
a coherent totality.31 As Charles Taylor put it: ‘the social imaginary 
is not a set of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense 
of, the practices of a society’ (2004: 2). Drawing on Anderson (1983) 
and Habermas (1989), for Taylor it implies a distinct, prescriptive 
or interpretive moral order, which encompasses a vision of social, 
30 The ineffable characteristics of imaginaries entails that the term can often 
be used sloppily. My usage is taken from Laclau’s rigorous, if somewhat 
theoretically sophisticated, delineation.
 The incomplete character of the mythical surfaces of inscription is the condition of 
possibility for the constitution of social imaginaries. The relation between the 
surface of inscription and what is inscribed on it is therefore essentially 
unstable. There are two extreme possibilities here. The first is the complete 
hegemonization of the surfaces of inscription by what is inscribed on them. 
As we mentioned earlier: the moment of inscription is eliminated in favour 
of the literality of what is inscribed. The other possibility is symmetrically 
opposite: the moment of representation of the very form of fullness domi-
nates to such an extent that it becomes the unlimited horizon of inscription 
of any social demand and any possible dislocation. In such an event, myth 
is transformed into an imaginary. The imaginary is a horizon: it is not one 
among other objects but an absolute limit which structures a field of in-
telligibility and is thus the condition of possibility for the emergence of 
any object. In this sense, the Christian millennium, the Enlightenment and 
positivism’s conception of progress, communist society are all imaginaries: 
as modes of representation of the very form of fullness, they are located 
beyond the precariousness and dislocations typical of the world of objects. 
Put another way, it is only because there are ‘failed’ objects, quasi-objects, 
that the very form of objectivity must free itself from any concrete entity 
and assume the character of a horizon (1990a: 63-64).
31 Taylor’s definition ran:
By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and deeper than the intellec-
tual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disen-
gaged mode. I am thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social existence, 
how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, 
the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and im-
ages that underlie these expectations interesting in the social imaginary is that it is 
shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society (2004: 23).
Taylor’s account is more thoughtful than Anderson’s which, remarkably, 
lacks a critical discussion of what he meant by two particularly contentious 
terms: imagination or community.
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economic and political relationships. A major drawback of these 
accounts is that they deal with an ideal. Problems arise when these 
imaginaries not only stand in stark, even cruel, contrast to what 
is manifestly going on, but impede people from articulating this 
and deter them from taking steps to improve the conditions under 
which they live. 
Against such ideal, sometimes nigh-utopian, visions, Althusser 
famously argued that ‘Ideology is a “Representation” of the 
Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions 
of Existence’ (1984: 153). Grand as it may sound, this leaves open 
on the one hand how and why people subscribe to ideological 
imaginaries, and on the other what ‘imaginary’ and ‘real’ connote 
here. On the first point, Althusser is clear: 
Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among 
the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into 
subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I 
have called interpellation or hailing (1984:160).32 
Examples immediately suggest themselves from theatre when the 
pelawak (servants) address spectators as fellow Balinese who are 
assumed to share the same values. And BaliTV largely devotes 
itself to hailing its audience as Balinese, who are then invited, 
indeed required, to imagine themselves as particular kinds of 
subject—authentic Balinese—in order to participate in the imagined 
community so formed.
Althusser’s formulation, however, needs qualification. 
Inter alia it assumes that human subjects stupidly, but blithely 
and unreflectively, live falsehoods; and that they have a unitary 
consciousness that systematically misrecognizes their real position 
in society. In Paul Hirst’s rephrasing, 
32 Note the similarity to Castoriadis’s analysis in The imaginary institution of 
society. 
 The subject does not express himself or herself but is expressed by someone, and 
therefore exists as a part of another’s world (certainly misrepresented in its turn). 
The subject is ruled by an imaginary, lived as even more real than the real, yet not 
known as such, precisely because it is not known as such. What is essential to het-
eronomy—or to alienation in the general sense of the term—on the level of the in-
dividual, is the domination of an autonomized imaginary which has assumed the 
function of defining for the subject both reality and desire (1997: 66-67, emphases in 
the original).
 Different societies not only have different imaginaries, but these need not 
be conservative and static. Radical imaginaries make change possible.
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the imaginary essentially consists in the idea that the subject lives its 
relation to its conditions of existence as if it were a subject. It is a subject 
because it exists in the realm of the ‘as if’, but it lives these relations as if 
they were true (1979: 34). 
Two other aspects of ideology and its imaginaries need mention. 
Although, as with Balinese representations of culture, which appear 
coherent, consistent, integrated and total, on closer examination 
there are invariably contradictions. Totality is, at best, an ideal 
to be striven for. The social always tends to overflow the bounds 
of society.33 In other words, practices often have the bad habit of 
not conforming to prescriptions or proscriptions. Furthermore, 
the notion of a unitary subject defined by a non-contradictory 
consciousness is pre-Freudian, effectively counter-factual and 
assumes a naïve account of humans as the origins of their own 
experience.34 This, of course, is one reason that it is so attractive to 
Balinese and foreigners who are nostalgic for a more wholesome, 
33 Criticizing accounts of society as a founding totality, in a seminal article 
Ernesto Laclau argued that 
 against this essentialist vision, we tend nowadays to accept the infinitude of the social, 
that is, the fact that any structural system is limited, that it is always surrounded by 
an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to master and that, consequently, ‘society’ 
as a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its own partial processes is an 
impossibility (1990: 90).
34  Hirst expanded:
The imaginary modality of living is necessary because men’s conditions of existence 
can never be given to them in experience. Hence the importance of the attack on the 
theory of ideology as experience. There cannot be any true or false consciousness 
because there is no basis for a correspondence between the experience of the subject 
and his social relations. This requires us to introduce the Althusserian concept of the 
social totality somewhat more rigorously than we have done heretofore. The social 
totality is conceived as a ‘process without a subject’. What does this mean? It means 
essentially that the social totality is not a process constituted by a subject, and that 
subjects occupy a place in it other than origin or author (1979: 32-33).
 Finally, Laclau elegantly dispensed with the conundrums of the unitary 
subject and false consciousness but, as noted above, he retained the notion 
of the imaginary.
The very identity of the social agents was increasingly questioned when the flux of 
differences in advanced capitalist societies indicated that the identity and homoge-
neity of social agents was an illusion, that any social subject is essentially decentred, 
that his/her identity is nothing but the unstable articulation of constantly changing 
positionalities. The same excess of meaning, the same precarious character of any 
structuration that we find in the domain of the social order, is also to be found in 
the domain of subjectivity. But if any social agent is a decentred subject, if when 
attempting to determine his/her identity we find nothing else but the kaleidoscopic 
movement of differences, in what sense can we say that subjects misrecognize them-
selves? The theoretical ground that made sense of the concept of ‘false conscious-
ness’ has evidently dissolved (1990: 92). 
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less fragmented, less complicated, less anomic world, that invites 
uncritical appreciation. Accepting Balinese culture at face value is 
like the White Queen in Alice through the Looking Glass, it is being 
able to believe seven impossible things before breakfast.
As my aim is to question what is often taken for granted and 
to encourage discussion, a conclusion would be out of place. My 
understanding of Balinese semantics is that questions or statements 
only have meaning insofar as they elicit a response, be it to intrigue, 
engage or just infuriate interlocutors (Hobart 2015). If I have 
stimulated discussion or disagreement, then I have succeeded; if 
not, not. But where does this discussion leave us? Let me return to 
two antithetical definitions of culture: culture as system or structure 
as against simply ‘how we do things around here’. While the former 
essentializes practices into a coherent totality by marginalizing 
or silencing whatever does not fit, the latter contextualizes and 
recognizes that different people articulate different accounts under 
different circumstances, so that ‘here’ is always situational. These 
two senses are antithetical and lead in quite different directions.
To clarify what I think is at issue, what is the relationship of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of codes to post-Althusserian notions 
of the imaginary? The two belong to quite different theoretical 
trajectories. Take the ethnographic example of a common occurrence, 
a village odalan (temple festival). During my first field research in 
1970-72, villagers talked to one another and explained to me that 
participation was above all about showing you were a member 
of the group or community. At once it obliged everyone to take 
part on pain of fines or even permanent exclusion, but also showed 
graphically both members and the wider society how active, 
cohesive and effective the group was. It was, as it were, a neat way 
of articulating and instantiating local social values. Twenty years 
later the same festivals took much the same form, albeit often with 
offerings on a grander scale. However, such events were usually 
punctuated by speeches from officials from the Council for Balinese 
Religion or local headmen delivering homilies on its behalf about 
how such festivals fitted into a seamless vision of Balinese religion-
and-culture. The former I take to involve rules and understandings 
for living, in this case how to be a member of well-functioning 
groups. The latter added little, if anything, to how to get on with 
the business of living, but instead synthesized elements that 
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were previously germane in different contexts—or, often, were 
invented lock, stock and barrel, but endowed with retrospective 
authenticity—to claim hegemonic status. The first seems to be a 
useful guide to get through the day, to explain what you are trying 
to do, to understand what others are up to and to reflect on what 
might be worth changing. The second, insofar as people subscribe 
to, act upon or even in some sense believe it, carries the risk of 
mistaking (at best) part for the whole, so encouraging acquiescence 
to circumstances that may well be deleterious to people’s overall 
interests. What happens when so much is now owned by a tiny 
minority of rich individuals and corporations; and Balinese are 
increasingly reduced to wage labourers on their own island?35 Then 
those flogging culture as the answer are not so much salesmen of 
snake oil as of opiates. If there is any truth in the stereotype that 
much of the Russian population copes with life by being lulled into 
semi-oblivion by alcohol, then overdosing on culture may be an 
enticing alternative—at the price of failing to recognize Bali as a 
battlefield.
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